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Abstract 
M&A is not only playing an important role in optimizing the allocation of resources and promoting the economic 
development, but also is important component of enterprise external growth. Synergy is not only the significant 
reason of M&A; at the same time，it is an essential measure standard of success or failure. This paper argues that the 
internal measurement model and abnormal returns methodology to measure are all not adapted to our special 
economic environment; therefore, this paper sets up the measurement model of synergistic effect based on financial 
index of accounting methods, and the M&A events from 2004 to 2006 in China was listed for the inspection analysis 
of the synergistic effect. Finally, based on the empirical results relevant suggestions were put forward.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAE2011. 
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1. Introduction
Merger and acquisition is an important part of the enterprise development. Experts and professionals
from domestic and abroad have mainly researched M&A synergies in three points: internal measurement 
model, study based on stock price changes, and accounting research method based on performance 
changes. The paper evaluates the synergistic influence of listed companies in China through accounting 
method based on performance changes.  
2. Model construction and the selection of indicators
2.1 The theoretical basis of model construction 
American experts in M&A say that synergy is the whole part after M&A in performance of merging 
company and target company and the achievement that surpass market expectations when the merging 
company and target company operate alone. This paper will construct econometric model of M&A 
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synergy strictly based on the definition above. The more accurate definition of M&A is the whole part of 
merge and acquisition.  
2.2 Construction of econometric model  
2.2.1 Define the relevant symbol 
A represents acquisition company, B represents target company, S  represents synergy 
effect,and
yn
ASF  and BSF  respectively represents actual performance score of company A and B after 
merging and acquisition.  and  represent achievement score computing at original increasing speed 
of company A and B if there is no merging and acquisition. 
AF BF
2.2.2Econometric model of synergistic effect 
(1) The M&A econometric model is      ( )yn AS A BS F F F= − +
(2) The formula of acquisition synergy 
①  The merging company will not make target company classified into consolidated financial 
statement. The econometric model is     ( ) (yn AS BS A BS F F F F= + − + )
② If it meets the standard of  two cases about merging and acqusition in thirty-third tready of  ASBE 
formulated in 2006 by Treasury Department, merging company will make target company into 
consolidated range, and the synergetistic formula is   ( )yn AS A BS F F F= − +
which can be simplified as , ( )yn T A BS F F F= − +
TF  represents total performance of both sides after trade.  
(3) Selection of performance indicators 
①ROA=net profit/total assets balance 
ROE=net profit/average balance of ② Shareholders' rights  
③Earning per share=net profit/total equity. This number reflects a company's profitability 
④The ratio of main business income and total assets=the main business income/average balance of 
total assets 
⑤Cash flow of operating activities per share=operating cash flow/weighted average number of shares. 
The score functions we create is （ ）i ij ij ij ij ij ij+ ij ij+ ij ijF f + f + f f fα α α α α= 1, 2,3, 4,5; 1, 2,3, 4,5i j= =
iF  is the scores that i-th company gets ijα  is variance contribution of i-th company and j-th 
ctor; ijf  is the scores i-jth facto
；
fa r gets. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data sources 
This paper chooses fourteen cases during 2004 to 2006 of M&A from GUOTAI JUNAN securities 
database service center CSMAR as samples, meeting the standards below to choose sample companies: 
listed companies belong to consolidation by merger; asset acquisition and share transfer are issued by 
CSMAR database; the merging company and target company have been listed for three years before the 
M&A. It is a several-merging-and-acquisition-trade event if the one acquisition company has merged 
many target companies in one year, if one acquisition company and one target company have engaged in 
several merger and acquisition in different years, which shall be treated as the same merger and 
acquisition trade event. Because of the particularity in financial operation and banking, this paper has 
excluded this kind of merger and acquisition events in listed companies. The transactions account for 
more than 10% of target company total shares, which is an important trade event for both sides. The 
transactions have an obvious effect on financial statements data in both sides. 
3.2 Empirical analysis 
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The calculation of M&A synergy 
This paper used the statistic analysis software of SPSS13.0 to calculate the M&A synergy, and the 
calculation process is as below: 
①The prediction score function FA that acquisition company forecasts according to expected growth 
speed.  
The year of causing M&A: 0 1 2 3 4 50.58804 0.20129 0.20071 0.00634 0.00362i i i iAiF f f f f= + + + + i
The first year after M&A:
f
5i
1
1 2 3 40.58614 0.20214 0.20086 0.00568 0.00518i i i iAiF f f f f= + + + + f
2
1 2 3 40.58394 0.20310 0.20162 0.00645 0.00488i i i iAiThe second year after M&A: 5iF f f f f= + + + + f
f
if
5i
The third year after M&A: F f3 1 2 3 40.58203 0.20398 0.20241 0.00713 0.00445i i i if f f= + + + + 5iAi②The prediction score function FB that target company forecasts according to expected growth speed.  
The year of causing M&A: 0 1 2 3 40.41391 0.32870 0.20870 0.03941 0.00927i i i iBiF f f f f= + + + + 5
The first year after M&A: 1 1 2 3 40.37627 0.33667 0.20770 0.05779 0.02157i i i iBiF f f f f= + + + + f
2
1 2 3 4 50.36760 0.31569 0.20803 0.05816 0.05052i i i iBiThe second year after M&A: iF f f f f= + + + + f
5if
5
The third year after M&A：F f3 1 2 3 40.35517 0.29013 0.20865 0.09274 0.05331i i i if f f= + + + +Bi③ The actual scores of performance in acquisition company FAS:
The year causing M&A: 0 1 2 3 40.56511 0.22105 0.20161 0.00970 0.00253i i i i iASiF f f f f= + + + + f
1
1 2 3 40.57385 0.20105 0.20060 0.01535 0.00915i i i iASiF f f f f= + + + +The first year after M&A： 5if
if
i
The second year after M&A： 2 1 2 3 4 50.57585 0.21479 0.20125 0.00432 0.00379i i i iASiF f f f f= + + + +
The third year after M&A： 3 1 2 3 4 50.55378 0.21009 0.20832 0.01919 0.00862i i i i f
if
i
ASiF f f f f= + + + +
 The actual score of performance in target company:④
The year causing M&A: 0 1 2 3 4 50.26275 0.25748 0.23128 0.20856 0.03992i i i iBSiF f f f f= + + + +
The first year after M&A： 1 1 2 3 4 50.49186 0.22310 0.21631 0.05742 0.01130i i i iBSiF f f f f= + + + + f
2
1 2 3 4 50.54287 0.21277 0.20064 0.03866 0.00506i i i iBSiF f f f f f= + + + +
 
The second year after M&A：  i
fThe third year after M&A：F f  3 1 2 3 4 50.48610 0.25908 0.23895 0.01396 0.00190i i i if f f= + + + + iBSi
Thus, we can compute the total scores corresponding years of merger and acquisition companies on 
both sides, and then calculate the synergy score of the year causing M&A, the first, second and third 
year after M&A, according to the function (n n n )nyn T A B .  is synergy effect scores in n-th 
year;  and  are respectively the expected achievements of company A and B;  represents years, 
( )
S F F F= − + nynSn
AF
0,1,=
n
BF
3
n
2,n
3.3 The empirical analysis results
3.3.1 Overall synergy effect 
In general, Figure 4-1 shows that merger and acquisition produces positive synergy effect in short 
time, but in the long term, it produces negative synergy effect.  
The figure shows definitely that the synergy scores decreased greatly in the second and third year 
after merger and acquisition. Although we observe the sample of M&A just in a short time, we still get 
the same points consistent with many scholars and experts. 
3.3.2 The type of M&A and the synergy 
M&A can be classified into horizontal mergers, vertical mergers and mixed mergers according to 
business relationships on both sides. Theoretically, the risk of mixed mergers is higher than the risk of 
non-mixed. In addition, the efficiency theory also indicates that mixed mergers can not improve the 
interests of enterprises and companies. It is the conduction of management personnel who is to reduce 
self-risk. 
The empirical analysis in this paper displays the synergy effect that different types of merger and 
acquisition activities display diversity. (Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2) 
3.3.3Associated M&A and synergy effect 
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This paper probed into the relationship of associated M&A and synergy effect. 
The results indicate that non-associated trade produces positive synergy effect. Although it drops later, 
generally it produces positive synergy effect. Despite that the non-associated business causes negative 
synergy effect, it also drops greatly in the later time. The results are different with the viewpoints of 
PAN Jin and CHEN Hong-min (2005), who contend that if enterprises and companies adopt associate 
merger and acquisition, their performance interests raise obviously, and it is better than companies adopt 
non-associate merger and acquisition. And the points of TANG Jian-xin, HE Hong (2005) and WANG 
Fu-sheng are in compliance. This paper agrees that the associated merger and acquisition may be 
affected by human factors, (the intervention of government authorities and personal factor of decision 
makers in enterprises) leading to this condition. And it ignores non-human factor, which reduces the 
synergy effect of associated merger and acquisition.  
3.3.4 Government intervention and synergy effect 
The results shows (Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-4) that merger and acquisition government authorities 
intervention causes negative synergy effect, although it rises in short time, remaining decline during 
following second and third years. While non-government intervention M&A gains positive synergy 
effect generally, it remains stable and rises in long period.  
Figure 4-1 M&A classification of synergy average score and positive ratio 
M&A Classification
n
ynS  
0
ynS  
1
ynS  
2
ynS  
3
ynS  
Average 
score 
0.04818 0.00506 -0.06964 -0.19207 
Total synergy 
Positive ratio 0.64290 0.57000 0.50000 0.42860 
Average 
score 0.15000 0.12927 -0.29303 -0.28943 Horizontal M&A 
Positive ratio 0.57140 0.71430 0.42860 0.42860 
Average 
score -0.22000 -0.17000 0.20000 -0.25000 Vertical  
M&A
Positive ratio 0.75000 0.25000 0.75000 0.50000 
Average 
score 0.16000 0.07695 0.09777 0.11661 Mixed M&A 
Positive ratio 0.66670 0.66670 0.33330 0.33330 
Average 
score 0.21650 0.11850 0.01040 0.02960 Non-associated 
business Positive ratio 0.70000 0.60000 0.60000 0.50000 
Average 
score -0.37260 -0.17890 -0.26960 -0.74610 Associate business 
Positive ratio 0.50000 0.50000 0.25000 0.25000 
Average 
score -0.51000 -0.29000 -0.81000 -1.26000 Government 
intervention Positive ratio 0.50000 0.33333 0.16670 0.00000 
Average 
score 0.16000 0.08000 0.10000 0.12000 Non-government 
intervention Positive ratio 0.75000 0.75000 0.62500 0.75000 
 
 
Horizontal M&A 
Vertical M&A 
Mixed M&A 
Figure 4-1 sample total synergy charting                    Figure 4-2 M&A classification and synergy 
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Government intervention 
Non-government Non-associated 
Associated
Figure 4-3 associated M&A and synergy                                               Figure 4-4 government intervention and synergy 
1
Specification: ， yn ， ，  respectively represents the average in the M&A year, the first, 
second and third year after M&A, the average is the arithmetic of total score, indicating relative change 
in the whole cooperate performance. Positive ratio is a rate the number of companies that difference of 
the whole score is positive occupied in total samples. 
0
ynS S
2
ynS
3
ynS
4. Implications 
4.1 Pay attention to synergy trap 
 Some enterprises blindly pursue the big scale and expansion in geographical areas, which engage in 
merger and acquisition not only in their industries, but also in other sectors, purchasing blindly mixed 
merger and acquisition. This blind action ignores two important problems: one is the boundary property 
of corporate, the other is that enterprises diversification are often associated with high risks. 
4.2 Consolidate the system integration after M&A 
During the integration of late merger and acquisition, it is influenced not only by external competitors, 
but also internal resistance. In addition, M&A integration itself involves wide areas, including 
interaction and interrelation of each system and operation link. The mistakes of any part may lead to 
failure of merger and acquisition. Therefore, it is vital and necessary to strengthen the integration in late 
M&A. Firstly, we should formulate the integration plan in details. Secondly, implement merger and 
acquisition. Finally, we should take valid control to make sure that the integration has been successfully 
implemented.  
4.3 Redefine the role of government plays in M&A  
The government as the holder of state-owned enterprises and companies directly involves in M&A 
transaction pricing decisions. And as market supervisor it also has approval power, holding public 
authority. Therefore, the government plays the roles of athletes and judgment, which leads to M&A 
subject dislocation that the government becomes main part of market instead of enterprises. The direct 
consequence is that government authority implements arbitrarily arranged M&A based on the 
achievements and self-interest. The man-made factor of production flow regulation, distorting the M&A 
price, leading low efficiency of merger and acquisition, is not conducive to resource optimal allocation. 
This is the major reason why the merger and acquisition synergy efficiency is low.  
The results of empirical analysis show that it causes negative synergy for M&A intervened by 
government. Although it rises in the first year, it remains to drop in following years. However, non-
government intervention M&A has positive synergy, remaining stable and raising in a long term. Thus, 
the government should redefine its role in M&A, acting as protector, and return enterprises M&A into 
market self-regulation. 
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